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Comparison and Alignment of Access Control Models 
Abstract: 
Security system policies are implemented in the computer through access control mechanism. The 
primary controls that the access control mechanism possesses are confidentiality, integrity, and 
security. Access control mechanism can be applied through any of the access control models. It  is 
is a way of protecting information or resources from the unauthorized user to provide access to 
authorized user. There exist different access control models in which all models are not adequate 
for today's digital environment. So, the problem arises in difficulty faced to choose which access 
control model suits well for a particular type of multi-user infrastructure with various access needs. 
Access control model differs according to the environment. There is an environment which grants 
access to its users within a particular network and for an environment which has users, who switch 
dynamically between different networks to access resources. Hence, determining the right model 
for the efficient use of resources and network is difficult, unless, there is a way to implement the 
needed concepts in our existing model as to make our new flexible model.  
Access control standards for managing different access privileges are complex to understand. With 
the emerging technologies, components of a system are getting updated, so, it will be a challenge 
to find out the suitable and flexible access control model that matches the system. Even though 
there are different access control model available, there is the real problem in finding out the 
needed access control mechanism which can be employed for the improvement of our new access 
control model for the efficient use of the resources to be accessed securely. 
The solution is to understand the weak and strong features of access control model by comparing 
different models and aligning their best features to compose into a flexible access control model. 
It is achieved with the help of systematic survey, where a group of audience validated that access 
control model can be understood and compared with three main components, subject, policy and 
object with underlying principles, meta-models and examples of three different access control 
model.  
Analytical comparison of different access control model is drawn from a report of how the 
audience deals with it at various cases that were analyzed. This survey helped to receive the 
opinion of different people realistically, such that this empirical way of conducting experiments 
concludes with the way for finding strong and weak factors. Finally, all the strong factors are 
aligned to form a new flexible access control model.  
The result helps to compare, study and implement a suitable and necessary access control system. 
It also makes us think in a way how a new access control system can be analyzed and compared 
with the existing ones. This research work result can be used for further research in future for the 
potential enhancement of newer access control models. 
Keywords:  
Access Control, Meta-model, Analytical Comparison 
CERCS:P170 omputer science, numerical analysis, systems, control 
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Juurdepääsu Poliitikate Võrdlus Ja Joondamine  
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Turvasüsteemipoliitikat rakendatakse arvutis juurdepääsu kontrollimehhanismi kaudu. 
Juurdepääsu kontrollmehhanismi peamised kontrollid on konfidentsiaalsus, terviklikkus ja 
turvalisus. Juurdepääsu kontrollmehhanismi saab rakendada mis tahes juurdepääsu 
kontrollmudelite kaudu. See on viis, kuidas volitamata kasutaja eest teavet või ressursse kaitsta, 
tagades juurdepääsu ainult volitatud kasutajale. On olemas erinevad juurdepääsu kontrollimudelid, 
kus kõik mudelid pole tänapäeva digitaalkeskkonnale piisavad. Seega tekib probleem probleemi 
lahendamisel, milline juurdepääsukontrolli mudel sobib teatud tüüpi mitme kasutaja 
infrastruktuuriga, millel on erinevad juurdepääsuvajadused. Juurdepääsu kontrollmudel erineb 
vastavalt keskkonnale. On olemas keskkond, mis annab juurdepääsu oma kasutajatele konkreetses 
võrgustikus ja keskkonnas, kus on kasutajaid, kes vahetavad ressursse pääsemiseks dünaamiliselt 
erinevate võrkude vahel. Seega on ressursside ja võrgu tõhusa kasutamise õige mudeli määramine 
keeruline, välja arvatud juhul, kui on võimalik olemasolevas mudelis kasutada vajalikke 
kontseptsioone, et muuta meie uus mudel paindlikumaks. 
Juurdepääsu kontrollimise standardid erinevate juurdepääsupõhiste õiguste haldamiseks on 
keerukad. Tekkivate tehnoloogiatega muutuvad süsteemi komponendid ajakohastatuks, seega on 
väljakutse leida sobiv ja paindlik juhtimismudel, mis vastab süsteemile. Isegi kui saadaval on 
erinevad juurdepääsukontrolli mudelid, on tõeline probleem leidmaks vajalikku juurdepääsu 
kontrollimehhanismi, mida saab kasutada meie uue juurdepääsukontrolli mudeli täiustamiseks, et 
turvaliselt juurde pääsedes ressursse tõhusalt kasutada. 
Lahenduseks on mõista juurdepääsu kontrollimudeli nõrku ja tugevaid omadusi, võrrelda 
erinevaid mudeleid ja viia nende parimad omadused kokku paindliku juurdepääsu kontrollimudeli 
koostamiseks. See saavutatakse süstemaatilise küsitluse abil, kus osalejad kinnitavad, et 
juurdepääsu kontrollimudelit saab mõista ja võrrelda kolme põhikomponendi, subjekti, poliitika ja 
objektiga, mille aluseks olevad põhimõtted, metamudelid ja kolme erineva juurdepääsu 
kontrollimudeli näited. 
Erinevate juurdepääsukontrolli mudelite analüütiline võrdlus põhineb aruandel selle kohta, kuidas 
kasutajad sellega erinevatel juhtudel tegelevad. See uuring aitas saada erinevate inimeste arvamust 
reaalselt nii, et see empiiriline katsete läbiviimise viis suudaks leida tugevaid ja nõrgemaid 
tegureid. Lõpuks viiakse kõik tugevad tegureid kooskõlla uue paindliku juurdepääsukontrolli 
mudeli loomisega. 
Tulemus aitab võrrelda, uurida ja rakendada sobivat ja vajalikku juurdepääsu kontrollisüsteemile. 
See paneb meid mõtlema ka sellele, kuidas saab uut juurdepääsu kontrollisüsteemi analüüsida ja 
võrrelda olemasolevatega. Reaalajas vaatajaskonna abil saab selle väljund olla realistlik. Seda 
uurimustöö tulemust saab kasutada juurdepääsu kontrolli mudelite edasiseks täiustamiseks. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Juurdepääsukontroll, Metamudel, Analüütiline võrdlus, Joondamine 
CERCS:P170 - Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine (automaatjuhtimisteooria) 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The motive of this research is to derive criteria from comparing different access control models 
and understanding its strong and weak features. Access control models are capable of protecting 
the resources and grant access to the subjects when needed. Considered access control models for 
this research are Discretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control, Risk adaptive access 
control, Attribute based access control and Role based access control.  
This research includes a survey of the access control models including a systematic analysis of 
their key principles with meta-models and examples. Systematic analytical comparison and 
empirical comparison of the selected access control models are done and validated with the help 
of a survey. The main problem here is there is no general way of understanding an access control 
model easily. Also, there is no common flexible model which fits all possible existing access 
control model.  
1.2 Scope 
The scope of the research work is to define comparison criteria for access control models. Existing 
works like [27] tells about the reference model by combining roles from RBAC and attributes 
from ABAC to become a scalable, flexible, auditable and understandable access control model, 
but, it fails to give a general comparison criterion or a general unified structure of an access control 
model. [26] suggests considering three abstractions in an access control model, such as, 
policies, models and mechanisms. Policies describe how access is managed and who will access 
in what condition. Mechanisms enforce policies and translate user's access request. Models 
connect policies and mechanisms. This paper describes only one of the component of access 
control model, policy in detail, but, it fails to describe other components like subject and object 
specifications and its other related components in much detail. [24] explains the need for a unified 
model for modeling authorization in an enterprise context. It proposes a unified model which 
is claimed to be flexible with suitable configurations. So, this paper shows the study of few access 
control models and its components and they unified it based upon the similar components, but, 
they fail to focus more on the structure of three main building blocks (Subject, Policy and Object) 
of an access control model, as, this is the base of any access control model. 
1.3 Research Statements 
Interest in this research topic urged to offer a solution for a research question “How can we 
compare an access control model and align it with best suitable concepts?” this can be 
answered with the following research questions. RQ1:"What are the most important access 
control models?” helped to find three main access control model to conduct this research. As each 
access control model has its key concept and each of them is different from other access control 
model, that provided the flexibility in conducting this research. RQ2:"How do we define 
comparison criteria for an access control model?”, This gives the essential key elements for 
comparison.  RQ3:" How can anyone understand an access control model with the help of 
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three building blocks?". Provides a solution through deriving comparison criteria and it is 
validated by a group of audience. RQ4:"How the conceptual model is constructed into a unified 
model?", Shows how the unified model is constructed with the best access control concepts. 
RQ5:" How can we verify our constructed unified model?”. Finally, the constructed unified 
model is validated here. RQ6:" What is the proof that this verified model is consistent and 
reliable?”. SRQ6.1: What are the limitations this unified model overcome? The answer to this 
question helped to develop an example to see the fitness of constructed model.    
1.4 Explanation of Contribution 
This paper starts with introducing what an access control model, why it is needed is and how it is 
functioning. For this study, I took three types of access control models, namely, RBAC, ABAC & 
RAdAC, because of its varied concepts. With this, I will explain its functional mechanism and 
discuss its specific characteristics in detail with a real-time example (University of Tartu Study 
Information System [28]). Validation of its characteristics will be carried out in the form of a 
survey. After this validation, a unified and flexible Metamodel will be constructed based upon the 
key concepts of three access control models which are followed by a validation against another 
unified model [24]. Conclusions will be made based on the validation. 
1.5 Structure of Work 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents and describes what are the most important 
access control models and what are its key concepts. Section 3 gives every detail about the three 
main building blocks of an access control model which helps in defining comparison criteria and 
leads to the construction of the unified model. In Section 4, shows the validation of three main 
building blocks derived in the previous section. Section 5, provides the flexible unified model, 
constructed with best building blocks. tells us the survey findings. Section 6 consists of validation 
process of the constructed unified model. Section 7 has an example of a unified model and this 
research paper is then concluded in section 8.   
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2 Overview of Recent Access Control Model 
Objective of the section is the result of finding an answer to the below question   
Q: What are the most important access control models? 
For there are different access control models, which have been designed by control policies that 
formalize them. Models included in this research are Mandatory access control [23], Discretionary 
access control [22], Risk-Adaptive Access Control [4], Role-Based Access Control [12], and 
Attribute-based Access Control [16] as these are considered to be the main access control models, 
which leads to the development of other hybrid models.  
2.1 Mandatory Access Control  
It implements security controls on access objects. It is generally based on sensitivity labels. 
Sensitivity labels are the labels that have two components, classification (level) and compartments 
(categories) [12]. Classifications are standardized with the measure of trust. The level of data can 
be classified accordingly in any of the following category SECRET, TOP SECRET, 
CONFIDENTIAL or UNCLASSIFIED. These four categories are the degree of protection. 
Industries have their own level of classification, hence, they are not standardized. Compartments 
represent categorization into certain groups according to the nature of the object. Max Label [23], 
Confidential, and Public are the three types of compartment an object can have. Confidential has 
three exclusive sub-compartments as follows Restricted, need to know and Internal Use Only. 
Public and Max Label don't have any sub-compartments. MAC policy [23] uses this sensitivity 
label to look for access control permissions. MAC [23] is associated with multilevel security model 
of Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model [23]. It was named after the person who found this model. 
This model assigns security labels to subjects and objects by using security properties [23].  
2.2 Discretionary Access Control   
It is an authorization based user-centric access control. Every system has its object, every object 
has its owner called subjects. Subjects are responsible for determining access control policies for 
their objects. Owner creates an object and determines access privilege to the users the owner wants 
to assign. Easy to implement in applications that are in distributed network. This mechanism 
allows an entity that performs an action in a system to gain control over the access rights without 
the pre-specified rules [12]. The file owner grants permissions on file for those users if the control 
over the access rights is perfectly managed. It is a technique for confining access to objects and 
the group it belongs. Controls are flexible in the view that certain subjects can transfer their access 
permission to the other subject permissions. Entities are known as subjects. These entities cause 
the flow of information between objects. Subjects can be users, process or devices. Generally, they 
are users who perform any operations on files. When the user assigns a job to perform in a system 
can be treated as a subject or the process that takes the attribute of the user can also be treated as a 
subject. If a process initiates a sub process it can be treated as objects. Normally files are called as 
objects if a file is split up into single pages, it will also be called as objects. In the same way, 
directories will also join as objects. Generally, a file is the common way of representing segments, 
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files, etc. Discretionary access control looks through the access information along with its files. 
So that hardware associated will be treated as files along with its access control information. 
Control permissions associated with the file actuate what all the subjects can access or cannot 
access to do any operations as permitted. Consistency in DAC implementation leads to less 
complexity in handling its objects. Objects protected by DAC depends on the capability of the 
system that contains its directories, devices and communication channels. The general-purpose 
operating system provides DAC with a user-friendly interface that displays a list of objects 
protected by DAC [22] 
2.3 Risk-Adaptive Access Control  
Risk Based Access control system has the capacity to adapt according to the increasing need for 
secure sharing. Which also resolves the pitfalls of traditional access methods. Whenever a subject 
requests for access RAdAC calculates the security risk and operational need of each request and 
provides or deny access. Hence it provides access dynamically based on a modern real-time 
paradigm [1]. Access control systems other than RAdAC does not have the flexibility and decision-
making system based on the various situational factors. Such situational factors are characteristics 
of people, characteristics of IT components, characteristics of objects, environmental factors, 
situational factors, and heuristics.  
 
Figure 1.  RAdAC Functional View [2] 
2.3.1 RAdAC Meta Model 
RAdAC system allows a subject to initiate access request through the IT component, which can 
be a computer, tablet, mobile device, etc., Each access request towards the resource goes through 
an RAdAC decision system. This is to determine the security risk and operational need. Once it is 
done it will be compared with the access policy to determine if the access can be granted for the 
requested resource. The access request of each and every user is treated as homogeneous.  
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Figure 2. RAdAC Meta Model. 
Subject: The subject is the user, who requests for access the resource. A User is defined as an 
entity that is requesting access. Although the subject of a user can be extended to include machines, 
networks, or intelligent autonomous agents, for simplicity we limit a subject to a human being. We 
assume that the subjects and other components are defined and represented by their attributes. 
Examples of subject attributes include subject’s identity, subject’s security clearance, and so on. 
Subject Attribute: It is defined as a characteristic of the subject it can be a computing device 
through which a subject is requesting access. Examples, where attributes of IT component are used 
in making access control decisions are a user's access to online banking account, is restricted to a 
pre-registered mobile device or an organization’s policy allow VPN access to employees from a 
device registered in its domain 
Policy: Highly robust infrastructure must exist to provide the access control policy enforcement 
needed to support RAdAC based decisions. At a high level, this infrastructure element acts as a 
repository for access control policies in a machine-readable format is served. Determining policies 
are always challenging. Policies are the representation of policy maker’s intent of sharing 
information under certain conditions and translate it into machine-readable format statements.  
Decision: RAdAC decision can be defined based on the security constraints and operational need 
defined in this section. Its Purpose is to find out the operational need and security level of the 
access request to access the resource. There are a lot of factors to captures the security risk from 
the access request. Situational factors determine under which conditions an access decision can be 
made and heuristics factor is defined to capture the access decisions that are made and also it 
provides input to the decision function. Under certain conditions, this RAdAC model allows for to 
override by an approved authority for the security risk at decision function. 
Object attribute: It is defined as a characteristic of the object. Which can be a resource component 
or a device, A device here is defined as a computing device through which the access request of 
the subject access the resource. Sufficient knowledge of the information and security robustness 
of a platform is called as an object attribute.  
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Object: Access is authorized or restricted to objects, depending on the labeling on the resource and 
the user’s credentials. A resource is an object (e.g., a file, a resource in the system). Multiple users 
can share common resources. ) A resource can be a tuple in a database, a table, a file, a service. 
Access Request: Access control policies are enforced through a mechanism that translates a user’s 
access request. It is a request to access the information or data or some valuable resource in a 
safeguarded network. This request is initiated by the user or subject to gain access to the resources. 
It is then sent to access control mechanism for authentication. Access requests not satisfying the 
given patterns of access control policies are identified and it undergoes the process of risk 
measurement and operational need function [5].  
Characteristics of People: This is one of the risk categories, its purpose is to assess the trustworthy 
of people who are requesting for access. Factors that help to determine the characteristics of people 
are role, rank, clearance level, access level, previous violations, and educational level. The role is 
the position of authority of the people in any organization. Rank determines the risk associated 
with the people’s position in an organization. For security measure, its likelihood of occurrence 
decreases as the people’s rank increases. Clearance level is inversely proportional to the risk value. 
The higher the clearance, lower the risk value. Access level defines the access level of the user. 
Risks are lower if the resource owner gives access to the user. If not or when the access was granted 
by the third party, risks are higher. In terms of previous violations risk factor increases. If there are 
no violations in the past it won’t lower the risk level. Educational level of the user either increase 
or decrease the risk factor based on the amount of security related training the user received. If the 
user received security related training, possibilities of committing a security violation are very less. 
If not higher possibilities for the occurrence of security violation due to negligent action [4].  
Characteristics of IT Components: IT components are the components that involve during the 
whole information transaction. The purpose of assessing risk factor here is to know how safe the 
data will be transit. The value of risk will be low whenever the level of protection is higher. Factors 
that help to determine the characteristic of IT components are the type of machines used, the 
traveling distance of the information, the level of encryption used to protect the information, type 
of network, authentication type of the user request, the connection type of the information, and 
type of application [4].  
Situationfactors: It is also called as situational factors security risk lies in the surrounding situation 
when information transaction happens. Risk factors to be considered here are specific mission role 
of the user who requests access, time sensitivity of the information, transaction type, auditable or 
non-auditable, audience size. Its purpose is to identify the security risk that revolves around the 
transaction, not the associated data or the user [4].   
Environmencondition: In the other way it is also called as environmental factors are the factors 
associated with the environment surrounding the transaction. It analyses the increased likelihood 
of how the surrounding environment can be exploited during the transaction. Its purpose is to 
assess the risk category of the transaction with regards to the environment. Factors considered for 
assessment are the current location of the requesting user and the data source [4].  
Characteristics of the Information Requested: This characteristic is to assess the risk factors 
involved in the requested information itself. Its purpose is to analyze the sensitivity of the 
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information. To find out the risk factors following are to be considered classification level of the 
data, encryption level required for access, network classification level for data transmission, 
permission level set in the data, time sensitivity of the data [4]. 
Heuristics: This helps to improve access control policies to grant decisions. Like, various access 
decisions in the past help to improve the decisions.  This is used to find the risk category in the 
transaction based on similar transactions that have occurred before. It helps to fine-tune access 
control policies, improve future access decisions and to predict the future behavior. Risk 
knowledge and trust level are the factors help to assess the risk factor of heuristics [4].  
Authority Human intervention or access authority intervention is allowed to change access policies 
and to address the operational need for a category of users under certain conditions. Access 
authority is an authoritative external source, who can be an administrator or a supervisor of 
approving authority to override security risk when necessary. Through this RAdAC allows 
operational need to override the measured security risk [6]. 
Policy: It is the specification of the rules of access control policies of information objects under 
different conditions. This is the place where we have to define the degree of operational need 
required to override the security risk to set it as acceptable. It should be defined in the way that the 
policy has the relative weight of each factor like personal risk, IT component risk, environmental 
risk, situational risk, heuristic risk and risks in accessing the requested information.  To make 
RAdAC more successful it is important to implement digital control policies effectively [4]. 
Security Risk Determination Function: RAdAC implements security risk measurement function, 
unlike traditional access control models. It converts the measured security factors into a positive 
or negative decision towards the access request. This security risk measurement function provides 
a numerical measure of the decision-making process. Here risks are grouped from different factors. 
Strong digital policies are needed to determine total security measurement [4]. 
Table 1.Risk Measurement 
Numerical 
Measure 
Explanation 
1 Low Risk 
2 Average Risk 
3 High Risk 
Operational Need Determination Function: This function determines the operational need of the 
access request and supports the access decision. It helps to give some quantifiable measure to 
compare with the access policies defined. Digital policies have the requirement for determining 
acceptable operational need. There are situations that security risk factors can be unacceptable but 
because of the operational need measure, the access could be granted. But it is necessary to show 
how operational need outweighs the security risk measure [4]. 
  
14 
 
Table 2. Operational Need Measurement 
Numerical 
Measure 
Explanation 
1 Low Operational Need 
2 High Operational Need 
3 Very High Operational Need 
Final Access Decision Function: The final access decision functions determine the decision 
whether to grant decision or not. It gets the input from security risk measurement function and 
operational need determination function and compares with the digital access policies which are 
already preset according to the requirements. If the access policies are satisfied then the access is 
granted else not [4]. 
2.3.2  RADAC Notational Process Model with Example 
Let’s consider the example of University of Tartu study information system. It is a system to 
manage all the information of students studying at the University of Tartu. It can be accessed either 
with the student user name and password or with an Estonian national ID card. It enables the 
students to use proactively anytime to know information about the courses and study programs 
available, provides personalized study timetable for students registered their courses, manages up-
to-date information about the student. Helps to register for courses and examinations. Also, it has 
the information about the academic progress of every student. Factors under which RAdAC can 
be implemented in OIS as follows. Unexpected situations when there is a need for flexibility in 
access control policy or violation of security policies in which the access is legitimate. Specific 
situations can be when a student has to register for a course at different faculty which has the 
nearest deadline and the person responsible for this registration is in absence. Valuation of 
coursework submitted by students by another professor when the responsible professor for that 
coursework is away from work. When there is a decision to be taken for stipend or Erasmus 
mobility or Erasmus scholarship, the responsible person is away from work due to unexpected 
sickness.  
Basic components needed to apply RAdAC in OIS are requestor characteristics, component 
characteristic, heuristics, local and global situational factors, environmental characteristics and 
characteristic of the requested data or information. When any of the above-mentioned factors arise, 
RAdAC takes certain functions as inputs and quantify them into certain measures to measure the 
security risk and operational need from the access request.    
In the case of the considered example suppose the program coordinator has to give a decision for 
a stipend in the form of a list of eligible students. Program coordinator should have full access 
towards the stipend rules and documents also the list of students who applied. So the person will 
click on gain total access at stipend page which is the access request for RAdAC system.   
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Figure 3.  RAdAC Notational View [4] 
Step 1 - Determining Security Risk or Security Risk Measurement Function: Security risk 
plays an important role in granting a decision towards the access request. From the access request 
made, several external factors are determined and quantified to determine the level of risk. Risk 
level is determined by the characteristic of people, characteristic of IT Components, situational 
factors, environmental factors, characteristics of information requested and heuristics. It outputs 
the quantitative indication of the risk level composed of each area described above [5].   
Through the access request of the above example, risk factors are determined as follows. As the 
requestor is the program coordinator and whose level of the profession has high standards in 
dealing with students. Who is also closely related to the person (who actually respond for granting 
stipend decisions) at dean’s office. Hence the classification level and encryption level of the 
requesting data is marked as high (3) because those factors need high-security measures, which is 
not easily accessible for anyone other than who has permission. Program coordinator 
characteristics such as role, rank, clearance level, access level, machine type, applications, 
connection type, authentication type, transaction type, network classification level and permission 
level are marked as average (2) in terms of security measure, as he is a highly ranked role in the 
university than compared to others. Rest of the factors such as risk knowledge, trust level, mission 
role, time sensitivity of the situation, audience size, auditable factor, location, operational 
environment threat level, and perishable factor are marked as low (1), as those factors cannot 
demand high-security risk for the program coordinator. Finally, the measured security risk factors 
are added totally and quantified in terms of percent. Hence for the considered example the measure 
comes to 51.86%. This result is carried forward to the next step.   
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Table 3.  Risk Measurement Calculation 
Risk Factors Considered Maximum Actual Security 
Measure 
Characteristics of People 
Role 3 2 
Rank 3 2 
Clearance Level 3 2 
Access Level 3 2 
Previous Violations 3 1 
Educational Level 3 1 
Characteristics of IT Components 
Machine Type 3 2 
Application 3 2 
Connection Type 3 2 
Authentication Type 3 2 
Network 3 1 
Encryption Level 3 1 
Distance from requestor to Source 3 
1 
Heuristics 
Risk Knowledge 3 1 
Trust Level 3 1 
Situational Factors 
Specific mission role 3 1 
Time Sensitivity 3 1 
Transaction type 3 2 
Auditable or Non Auditable 3 1 
Audience Size 3 1 
Environmental factors 
Current Location 3 1 
Operational environment threat level 3 1 
Characteristics of Information Requested 
Classification Level 3 3 
Encryption Level 3 3 
Network classification level 3 2 
Permission Level 3 2 
Perishable or Non Perishable 3 1 
Sum Total 81 42 (51.86 % of 
81) 
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Step 2 – Comparison of Security Risk or Security Risk Measurement Function against 
Policy: In this step, it compares the security risk obtained from the previous step with the 
implemented policies. This is the place to identify the acceptable level of risk for the requested 
data being accessed. By comparing it with the policies implemented it says whether the security 
risk is acceptable or not [5].   Hence it compares the measured security risk 51.86% with the policy. 
Here policy categorizes the result in any of the following.  0% – 49.99% as low, 49.99% – 69.99% 
as high, 69.99% – 100% as very high. So only low category is set to accept in this level, remaining 
is not acceptable per policy. According to the result, obtained process flow goes to the step 4.   
Step 3 – Policy for Verifying Operational Need: At this step the resulted security risk measure 
is been accepted and seems ok in terms of security risk. This step is to find out whether the user’s 
request has to be analyzed for operational need. By comparing it with the access policy, may results 
need in determine the operational need? In this case, it undergoes other steps, if not access with 
being granted towards the access request [5].     
Step 4 - Policy for Overriding Security Risk or Security Risk Measurement Function: This 
step will be executed only when the security risk was not acceptable, but the request seeker might 
have the operational need to access the information irrespective of the risk. Here the policy should 
be capable of demonstrating how the operational need can outweigh the security risk. Here factors 
like user trustworthiness, user location, IT components, and situational factors can be analyzed 
again. After the analysis, if the override is allowed further processing is necessary to see if the 
operational need outweighs the security risk. Access will be denied if the override is not allowed 
[5]. So the considered example results in 51.86% in security measure and here it verifies with the 
policy if it allows operational need to overrides the security measure. The policy is set as follows, 
high (50% to 69.99%) security measure is allowed to override but very high (70% to 100%) is not 
allowed to override the security risk. According to the policy, it allows this security risk measure 
to override the operational need, in case if operational need verification results positive. Hence for 
the outputted result, it allows overriding the security measure. 
Step 5 – Assess Operational Need: At this step, the examination is done to determine the 
operational need to access the object. The policy has to be implemented in such a way that it would 
specify different requirements for determining operational need because of both which security 
risks are acceptable and which security risks were not acceptable, undergoes this process. 
Requestor’s location, rank or any discretionary factors might be used to determine the operational 
need [5]. 
Operational need for the considered example can be assessed as follows. As the requestor is the 
program coordinator whose operational need for the factors like transaction type and audience size 
is considered to be low (1), because whose transaction type will be usual and there is no more than 
1 in audience size. In the case of factors like clearance level, risk knowledge, time sensitivity, and 
classification level are marked as high (2). But in the case of role, rank, trust level and specific 
mission role it is marked to be very high, as these are the factors that demand high operational 
needs. Once all the factors are marked it will be totally summed up and it will be converted to a 
percentage. So the output will be 73.33%.  
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Table 4.  Operational Need Measurement 
Factors Considered for 
Operational Need Measure 
Maximum Actual Security 
Measure 
Characteristics of People 
Role 3 3 
Rank 3 3 
Clearance Level 3 2 
Heuristics 
Risk Knowledge 3 2 
Trust Level 3 3 
Situational Factors 
Specific mission role 3 3 
Time Sensitivity 3 2 
Transaction type 3 1 
Audience Size 3 1 
Characteristics of Information Requested 
Classification Level 3 2 
   
Sum Total 30 22 (73.33 % of 30) 
Step 6 – Comparing Operational Need against Policy: After determining the operational need 
of the request with the necessary factors, this step comes into action. It compares the determined 
operational need with the access policy which was already defined to see if it is sufficient enough 
to grant access, if not the access will be denied. And the policy required to compare at this step 
should be capable enough to determine sufficient operational need in both stressed and unstressed 
security conditions [5].  
Here the policy is set to accept those operational need measure which has the output more than 
70%. In this case, it can override the security risk measure. In the example the output of the 
operational need measure is 73.33%, which is evaluated by the policy to be positive. Hence the 
access will be granted.  
Step 7 – Post-Decision Processing: Once the request is been processed by granting the access or 
by denying, its result is stored for post-decision processing. It helps to improvise the decision 
processing of RAdAC decision engine [4]. Results made will be available for the resource or 
information owners to help them in improving their access control policies [5]. 
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2.4 Role Based Access Control  
RBAC is a simplified access control model to define security access to different systems.  Because 
of its cost effective measures and simple administration. The basic concept of RBAC is users can 
access an object or resource by getting assigned to roles, permissions are also assigned to roles. 
Permissions are acquired by users only by being members of roles. The user can have many roles, 
the single role can be assigned many permissions [7] [12]. 
2.4.1 Core Components of RBAC 
User: User can be defined as a human being. This can also include intelligent autonomous agents 
such as robots, computers, etc. But to keep it simple, a user in this RBAC model is considered as 
human being. Users are assigned to roles [7]. 
Role: Roles are the user groups or can be defined as a job or job title in an organization. 
Permissions of the users are associated with roles. Roles describe the level of access of the user 
[7]. 
Permission: permission is consent or approval of access to one or more objects in the system. 
Permissions hold the access control to perform any actions. Authorization, access right, and 
privilege are the terms of the other that represents a permission. Permission helps to perform some 
action in the system [7]. 
ActionType: Action type is the four different type of actions used to perform operations on the 
object. Those actions are Insert,  read, write and execute operations [7]. 
Resource: Resource is also called as objects. The object can be defined as data. Every system in 
access control model protects its object. Hence, the access control system protects directories, files, 
ports, and devices with action type [7]. 
 
Figure 4. RBAC [7] 
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2.4.2 RBAC MetaModel 
 
Figure 5. RBAC Meta Model, adapted from [12] 
The above representation of the RBAC Meta model and its relation between the components are 
explained as follows [13].  
Users the humans are often represented as a user, but sometimes the user can also be systems and 
it extends to networks or intelligent autonomous agents. Roles are the job functions defined for an 
organization. Sometimes it also refers to the responsibilities of the particular role in an 
organization. Permissions are the organizational consent to perform specific operations. Action 
type is the elements used to classify permissions. Here every Action Type represents a class of 
security-relevant operations. Resource type defines all action types available for a particular meta-
model type. Resource set represents a user defined a set of model elements used to define 
permissions and authorization constraints. Protected resources are expressed using the standard  
UML elements called model elements. Authorization constraint expresses a precondition as a part 
of the access control policy. It imposed to every call to an operation of a resource. This 
precondition usually depends on the dynamic state, the current call, or the environment. The 
authorization constraint is attached either directly or via permissions, to a particular model element 
representing a protected resource. 
2.4.3 RBAC Example 
It is possible to develop the RBAC model using security modeling language. In this section of 
RBAC example, Secure UML[14] [15] has been used to illustrate the principles of RBAC. The 
abstract syntax of Secure UML is shown in Figure 6. Secure UML has annotated UML based 
models with the necessary information for access control. This is based on RBAC with additional 
authorization constraints. SecureUML[14] [15] defines a vocabulary for roles, role permissions 
and user-role assignments. SecureUML is well suited for business analysis and different 
technologies. It is used here to cover access control aspects of RBAC. The semantics of Secure 
21 
 
UML is defined using informal transformation rules. A role in the access control model is 
transformed into a single element of type security-role or secuml.role. The user is transformed into 
security-user or secuml.user. Permission is transformed into security-permission or 
secuml.permission. The resource is transformed into security-resource or secuml.resource. To 
represent any actions we use security-actions or secuml.action in SecureUML model. These action 
includes Insert, Update, Select and Delete[12] 
 
Figure 6 : Security Actions of SecureUML Model [12] 
Let’s assume the system as Study Information System of the University of Tartu, which provides 
information about courses, study programs, allow students to register for courses, exams and apply 
for a scholarship at the University of Tartu. For this example, we consider the situation as the 
department coordinator needs all of his eligible Students to apply for the newly introduced 
scholarship by submitting required information through Study Information System of the 
University of Tartu. Let's say that there are three users Andrew, Mark, and John, who play different 
roles in the considered example. We also consider that a resource (i.e, ScholarshipApplication), 
which characterize name and academic results of the student to be secured. This restricts by 
changing the value of attributes into a state, by defining resource ScholarshipApplication for the 
role Coordinator and role Student.   
 
Figure 7: RBAC Example 
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Association class CoordinatorPermission characterises two actions for Coordinator: (i) action 
enterRegistrationDetails (of the type Insert) defines that Coordinator can enter information by 
executing operation setInfo() at class ScholarshipApplication, and (ii) action changeInfo(of the 
type Update) allows to change the information of the ScholarshipApplication by executing 
operation changeInfo(). We also define authorization constraints to strengthen permissions.  
AC#1:  
Context ScholarshipApplication :: setDateTime ( ) : void 
pre : self . responsibleCoordinator . assignedUser  -> 
exists ( i | i . assignedUser = ‘ Andrew ’ ) 
Authorisation constraint AC#1 means that operation setInfo() can be executed by user Andrew, 
assigned to a role Coordinator  
AC#2:  
Context ScholarshipApplication :: changeDateTime ( ) : void 
 pre : self . responsibleCoordinator . assignedUser  -> 
       exists ( i | i . assignedUser = ‘ Andrew ’ ) 
Authorisation constraint AC#2 defines the restriction for operation changeInfo(). Association class 
StudentPermission defines the restriction for role Student. It defines an action getScholarshipInfo() 
of type Read says that only Student can view info in the ScholarshipApplication. To enforce this 
permission as authorization constraint AC#3 is defined. 
AC#3:  
Context ScholarshipApplication :: viewDateTime ( ) : void 
 pre : self . enrolledStudent -> 
   exists ( p1 | p1 . assignedUser = ‘ Mark ’ ) and 
 self . enrolledStudent -> 
   exists ( p1 | p1 . assignedUser = ‘ John ’ ) and 
 self . enrolledStudent -> size = 2 
Authorisation constraint AC#3 defines that only users Mark and John of assigned role Student can 
execute an operation viewInfo(). In this example security actions like Update, Insert and Select 
data are defined. An action Delete is not used in this example.  
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2.5 Attribute Based Access Control  
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [16] provides access on the basis of attributes. 
Normally access control is based on the user identity who requests to perform some operation 
on an object. This is done either directly or through user groups or assigned roles. This approach 
has been noted that it. It is been noted that it is burdensome to associate the request for the user, 
roles or groups. Because they are insufficient in matching with the real world policies. Hence 
when we look for a solution it can be carried out easily through the attributes of the object, 
attributes of the user, conditions of the environment that are recognized globally for the policies. 
This concept is called ABAC. ABAC controls access to its objects by evaluating the rules against 
the attributes of subject and objects, the operations it deals with, and the environment it dealt 
with. With ABAC it is easy to implement both Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC). ABAC has the possibility of allowing. It is called 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) because the access control is based on the discretion of the 
owner. It is also called Mandatory Access Control (MAC) because the system authorizes which 
subjects can access the data objects. This model is based upon the security labels [16].  
 
 
Figure 8: ABAC Basic Mechanism [16] 
Attributes:  An attribute is a function which takes user or subject as an entity. It is a building 
block to define access control rules and to describe access. Access is granted to users with the help 
of policies. These policies combine the attributes together. Attributes are evaluated against the 
policies and access to objects are granted based on the evaluation [16]. 
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Subject: The subject is an entity that sends a request to perform an operation. Which is mostly 
referred to as humans. As they are the one who creates to perform some actions in the system. It 
can also be referred as the requestor. Sometimes a non-person entity (NPE) can also act as a 
subject. A non-entity person (NPE) is an autonomous service that performs its operation with 
authority. Generally, every operation performed by the computer is either done by a person 
(human) or NPE is called as the subject. Which requests access to an object [16]. 
Subject Attributes: These are the attributes associated with the subjects or concerning the person 
or actor being evaluated. Each subject is assigned with a finite set of subject attribute functions. 
Subject attributes are created by the user and constrained with different policies for security 
architects. This can be explained as the value of the subject attributes can be inherited from its 
corresponding user [16]. 
Rules: Rules are the constraints. Based on the evaluation of functions it returns either true or false. 
Constraints are configured through policy languages. One can apply a constraint during the 
creation of subject and object, and also during the modification of subject and object [16]. 
Enforce: After evaluating rule relationship ABAC enforce relationships between attributes and 
environmental conditions. During enforcement flexibility in secure sharing and protecting 
information of specific resources in ABAC is been maintained [16]. 
Object: An object is the resource of the system that needs to be protected, for which the access 
control mechanism is managed by ABAC. They can be created by a subject on behalf of its user 
[16]. 
Object Attributes: Object attributes can also be referred to as resource attributes, which are 
attributes of the target or object being affected. While creating an object, values for its attributes 
may be set by the user through the subject [16]. 
2.5.1 ABAC MetaModel 
 
Figure 9: ABAC Metamodel 
When the subject is requesting access to the object, subject attributes are compared with the access 
control policy along with environmental conditions. Then it ensures if the subject can access the 
requested object.  
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Subject: Subject or user class is characterized by its own attributes called as its identity. The 
subject class takes action on a resource. Each subject attribute defines the character of the subject. 
Such attributes are name, organization, title, project, and so on. Here subject’s role is considered 
to be an attribute [20].  
Subject attribute: It is defined as a characteristic of the subject it can be a computing device 
through which a subject is requesting access. Examples, where attributes of IT component are used 
in making access control decisions are a user's access to online banking account, is restricted to a 
pre-registered mobile device or an organization’s policy allow VPN access to employees from a 
device registered in its domain 
Environmental Condition: Environmental condition class is the inputs derived from the external 
factors. This can also be ignored in access control policies. These describe the operational, 
situational and technical environment with its environmental attributes. Such as date and time [20].  
Policy: Whenever the objects are created, its policy rule of what subject attribute can access the 
object will be derived at first. So when the subject is trying to access the particular object in the 
form of attributes derived from subject and object, subject attribute matches with the existing 
policies. When the match evaluates to true access is granted through access control policy class 
[20].    
Object: Object or resource class is also characterized by its own attributes called as its identity. 
Object class allows the access of subject when policy evaluates to true. An object attribute is often 
extracted from the metadata of the resource. For example, object attributes can be the title, subject, 
author, project, etc., [20].   
Object attribute: It is defined as a characteristic of the object. Which can be a resource component 
a device, A device here is defined as a computing device through which the access request of the 
subject access the resource. Sufficient knowledge of the information assurance capabilities and 
security robustness of a computing platform, as well as the risk associated with the environment 
in which it resides, will be required to determine the security risk of allowing access from that 
computing platform to the specific resource requested. 
2.5.2 ABAC Example 
Let’s consider our Study Information System of the University of Tartu, which provides course 
related information to the student and the University staffs in which consider that it is implemented 
with ABAC. When SIS is live with ABAC implementation consider the following scenario as an 
example of ABAC implementation. This SIS system has students from a different department, they 
can be considered as Subject. Every Subject has its own attributes called subject attributes. 
Likewise, objects in the SIS has object attributes and environmental condition attributes. Object 
attributes can be any objects which the student or staff can able to access, can be a subject 
information, exam information, personal data, academics data, academics result, class data, etc., 
Environmental attributes can be a date, time or any other external factors other than subject and 
object. Which acts as a constraint in accessing different resources. 
In our considered example of ABAC implemented the system, the student as a Subject, who has 
Subject attributes as software engineering department, with active student status is trying to access 
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the Object of the list of students in his department, which also has an Object attribute as software 
engineering department. Environmental condition can be the ongoing current academic year.  
So here the policy can be defined as follows with a subject attribute, object attribute and 
environmental conditions like a subject which is from software engineering department with active 
student status can only access the object with attribute software engineering department under the 
environmental condition as a current active academic year. Hence for those subjects whichever 
has the respective attributes as described in the policy can only access its assigned object.  
If the subject has to access the list of students from a different department (different object) like 
computer science instead of software engineering, the same subject has to have its respective 
attribute as computer science department. Only then according to the newly assigned policy this 
object would be accessible. This can be clearly depicted in the below diagram in which terms are 
mentioned very general for a better understanding of this concept.      
 
  Figure 10: ABAC Example 
2.6 Summary  
In this chapter we discussed the important access control models in detail. From those models, we 
took three most important Risk-Adaptive Access Control, Role based access control, attribute 
based access control for further research. We also described its metamodels with corresponding 
examples. For those examples, we considered Study Information System from the University of 
Tartu. Hence this chapter leads to the further research in identifying the main building blocks of 
an access control model.  
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3 Comparison of Access Control Model 
Aim of this section is the result of finding an answer to the below question   
Q: How do we define comparison criterias for an access control model? 
This section defines comparison criterias based on the fact that it should be common in every 
accesss control model, at the same time, it has its own unique key concept which will be different 
or similar that other access control model. Based on that an access control model can be divided 
in to three main components Subject, Policy and Object. Subsections below will be brief about 
these three main components.    
3.1 Comparison of Subject 
In order to understand the subject context, will start with a question: “How to identify a 
component as a subject component?" for this question, first of all, will refresh the subject term, 
what a subject is. The subject is the one who initiates the flow of access control request. Whichever 
the component associated with the component requests for access is called as subject component 
and all the subject component comes under the subject boundary context.  
After that the subject components are identified, now we need to know the answer to another 
question: How does a subject help to compare access control model? As you see from the access 
control models discussed, the subject is not the same in all aspects. The boundary of the subject 
and its behavior differs according to its access control model.  
For instance, in RBAC, User and Role are together called as the subject. So, User is the one who 
requests for access, as the user is connected to the role, based upon the role the access is restricted 
with the help of permission. So, the subject boundary of RBAC ends at Role.  
In ABAC, Subject and Subject attribute are called as Subject. Here when the subject requests 
access, its attributes are evaluated by the policy. The subject boundary of ABAC ends at subject 
attribute.  
RAdAC's [4] subject boundary is little bigger than other access control model. As it has to calculate 
the risk, Situational factor and heuristic are included in the subject boundary.  with subject and 
subject attribute. If it is usual access control model only subject and its attributes will be enough 
to be called as the subject. As it is RAdAC[4], due to the need of risk calculation it considers 
situational factor and Heuristic as the subject. Along with it, Access authority is also included in 
Subject boundary because access authority can override an access decision under the specific 
condition when there is a need to attest to a subject's need. Hence in RAdAC[4] Subject, Subject 
attribute, Situational factor, Heuristic and Access authority are included in the Subject context. 
Coming back to the research question, it can be answered as from the above discussion it is clearly 
known that subject is not the same in various access control model. One can understand it by 
comparing the subject context boundary of various access control model(For example with RBAC, 
ABAC and RAdAC[4]). By comparing, it can be found that which of the subject component suits 
well and efficient for the environment we consider. Also if we need to add any other factor from 
other access control model that may seem useful in our subject context. 
28 
 
 
Figure 11: Subject Comparison 
3.2 Comparison of Policy 
Comparison of policy will start with a research question RQ:"How to identify a component as 
policy component?" The answer is simple, can be explained as follows. The policy is the condition 
or a rule that evaluates the access request. It restricts the access request of a subject, which is not 
authorized to access the object. If a component helps in filtering the access requests that seems to 
act as a condition or a rule. So this way it is easy to identify if it is a policy component. A policy 
also has the following attributes: A scope, mechanism, an action, and a triggering event or 
condition, the rule set of policies must be centrally defined. As the question for first research 
question is obtained. Now will find out, RQ: "How does the policy help to compare access control 
model?" for this analysis, let us start figuring out the policy and its behavior of three different 
access control model one by one. In RBAC access control requests are filtered out with the help 
of Permission. Policy component of RBAC has two entities Permission and Action. Whereas the 
permissions available to the role are the union of actions and operations. Action determines what 
to perform with the operation. So what the user can do is determined by this Action entity. 
Whatever the action is allowed by the user to perform are listed as Security Action (Fig). This 
security action is mapped to suit any actions of real-time. For example, if there is a user who has 
to give permission for copying a file, this will be achieved through security action Select (Ref 
Fig.). Permissions are assigned to roles, Single permission can be assigned too many roles, and 
single role can have much permission. So this is about the policy context of RBAC.In ABAC 
policy is also called as rules. Rules are the constraints. Which evaluates Subject attributes and 
object attributes. ABAC policy uses certain keywords it can be of our own choice based on the 
implementation logic. Use of keywords is to evaluate attributes effectively to fulfill the ultimate 
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goal. So with the help of keywords, it is possible to combine two or many attributes to create a 
policy in a more customizable way. This provides a way to create policies towards the targeted 
subject or object. Normally policies are expressed in natural language, machine understandable 
format. Policy representation is still an active topic of research. So far policies are used to represent 
in Rei, XACML, OWL formats [25]. Policy representation is chosen based on the flexible 
construct a language provides for the actual need. So, this is about the policy context of RBAC. 
The key concept of RAdAC lies in the dynamic management of policies, as administrator changes 
the limit of security risk and operational need. Policies, used by both the Security Risk Function 
and the Operational Need Function, may consist of simple if/then statements. Administrators 
manages  rules in the policy system. Network server makes policy decisions in response to a 
request from a user wanting to access a resource[28].  
This helps to derive the answer for the RQ, which is policy is also not the same in different access 
control model. This can be understood by comparing the policy context of different access control 
model. After the discussion of policies of three different access control model (RBAC, ABAC & 
RAdAC) it is easy to understand that policies of the different access control model are not the same 
and each has its own merits and demerits. Based on our needs, we can compare just like above and 
understand its merits from a different model and employ those in the new paradigm which we are 
going to construct. For instance, policy context of any access control model can be replaced by 
desired and suitable policy context for the considered environment. Alternatively, even other 
factors can also be added if felt that would be helpful.   
 
Figure 12: Policy Comparison 
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3.3 Comparison of Object 
To discuss the object comparison and its behaviors, will start with the same as other RQ:"How to 
identify a component as object component?". There can be many objects in a system. The object 
is a target of every subject in which the allowed subjects are given a chance to perform permitted 
actions in their place. The object is one of the purposes that access control model has a purpose. 
As the answer to the first research question is already found, there is a more RQ that has to be 
answered, RQ: "How does the object help to compare access control model?". The object of 
different access control model shares the same purpose, but the form of representation may differ 
within different access control model. Hence by comparing it helps us to know about its strong 
and weak features between the objects of different access control model. Thereby we can add any 
concepts within its boundary if we found it as beneficial.  
  
Figure 13: Object Comparison 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter provides the comparison criteria of an access control model, and it shows how the 
three essential models are compared with that criteria. This chapter which says how different 
access control models can be compared in a similar way   
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4 Survey Analysis and Findings 
Objective of this section is the result of finding an answer to the below question   
Q: How can anyone understand an access control model with the help of three building blocks? 
This section acts as a proof of understanding the concepts of any access control model with the 
help of three main components (Subject, Policy & Object). We introduced three access control 
models for this survey, they are RBAC [12], ABAC [16], and RAdAC [4] to conceptualize and to 
help to compare the strong and weak features based upon the response of 53 audiences. This is 
done as a systematic survey by explaining the underlying principles, meta-models, examples to 
the audience group and by capturing their experience with it. Intention is to make empirical 
comparison for selected access control model by conduction a survey explaining the audience 
about three main components of an access control model which is Subject, Policy, and Object 
4.1 Problem Statement  
There exists many access control model. To implement the right access control model for our 
systems Firstly one needs to know its strong and weak factors also one has to understand the policy 
standards for a different model and if that is suitable for the current system in which it is going to 
be implemented. So that the resource can be used efficiently and securely. These days with the 
advancement of science and technology it is not easy to figure out the suitable access control model 
that matches the system. To compare its core component to match the system in need, this analysis 
is done Goal 
4.2 Goal 
The main goal of this survey is to make the audience understand these three main access control 
model with the help of three building blocks. This helps to validate and generalize the comparison 
criteria of different access control model.   
4.3 Experiment Planning 
This is done as a systematic survey by explaining the underlying principles, meta-models, 
examples of different access control models to the audience and by capturing their experience with 
it. There by it outputs the real-time experience of the different audience. Which is the one of the 
possible solution to find out the strong and weak characteristics of different access control models 
Analytical comparison of different access control models is drawn from a report of how the 
audience deals with it at different cases that have to be analyzed. This way gives the opinion of 
different people in a realistic way. 
4.4 Experiment Operation 
The survey was done with a group of 53 students from the University of Tartu. Have presented 
three access control models (RBAC [12], ABAC [16] & RAdAC [4]) by focusing on the basic 
components of Subject, Object, and Policy. This presentation session was followed by a task and 
questionnaire session. The audience had 3 tasks for three different access control models in which 
they were given an example model and asked to find out its Subjects, Objects, Policies and to run 
a simulation in that model representation. Through our tasks audience easily understood the main 
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concepts of this three access control model. But the same time some places in the task lacked some 
logical representation which made the audience to go wrong with the answers. 
4.5 Data Analysis  
Have received 53 responses for the task. Some of the responses are mixed responses while others 
are very particular. Table 5 shows the response count for the various category. Hence have to 
eliminate the components which show the minimum count which is marked in gray color also in 
the table at the interpretation of results it is been mentioned clearly about total minimum count as 
a response. 
Ease of Learning: It tells how quickly the system can be learned by the various groups of users 
when access control models are compared. This quality helps for easy memorability. Which 
provides the ease of adoption from one model to the another if one model is been followed from 
time to time 
Task efficiency:  It tells how quickly the system can do a task efficiently when access control 
models are compared. This quality helps to know the performance of access control model when 
compared. It shows the ability of a model to achieve its performance.  
Ease of remembering: It tells how quickly the system can be remembered for the occasional user 
when access control models are compared. This quality helps the user or administrator to 
remember its concepts and predict the outcome of the actual model. Hence this helps to know if 
the model of the system is functioning as designed.  
Subjective satisfaction: It tells how quickly the system adapts to satisfy user needs when access 
control models are compared. This quality helps the user to know about the system if it adapts to 
the varying needs from time to time under certain conditions. 
Understandability: It tells how easy is to understand the system functionality when access control 
models are compared. This quality helps the user to understand better about the model. So that the 
user can know under which situation they would be in need of such model.  
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Table 5.  Questionnaire response count 
 Access Control Model 
 RBAC ABAC RAdAC 
Ease of Learning: 
How quickly the system can be learned by the various groups of users? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to learn? 36 22 16 
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to learn? 30 22 14 
Which model Object is easy to learn? 31 23 18 
Which model is easy to learn? 32 20 15 
 
Task efficiency:  
How quickly the system can do a task efficiently? 
 
Which model Subject is efficient for frequent use? 34 13 15 
Which model Policy/Permission is efficient for frequent use? 27 21 11 
Which model Object is efficient for frequent use? 27 17 15 
Which model is efficient for frequent use? 30 16 11 
Ease of remembering: 
How quickly the system can be remembered for occasional user? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to remember for occasional use? 24 21 19 
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to remember for 
occasional use? 24 17 16 
Which model Object is easy to remember for occasional use? 23 22 20 
Which model is easy to remember for occasional use? 23 20 15 
Subjective satisfaction: 
How quickly the system adapts to satisfy user needs?  
 
Which model Subject is satisfied with most of all occasions? 29 21 6 
Which model Policy/Permission is satisfied with the system? 29 13 16 
Which model Object is satisfied with the system? 31 16 13 
Which model is satisfied with the system? 35 15 8 
Understandability: 
How easy is to understand the system functionality? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to understand? 28 23 20 
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to understand? 26 19 21 
Which model Object is easy to understand? 29 17 20 
Which model is easy to understand? 28 19 16 
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Figure 15: Survey outcome for Subject  
Here subjects of three access control model are taken in to account from the survey response and represented 
in histogram for further analysis. We can see that RBAC ranks highest in all the five category of learning. 
Among the five-different category (Ease of Learning, Task Efficiency, Ease of Remembering, Subjective 
Satisfaction, Understandability). Ease of Learning ranks top from audience. Then if we look closer in to it, 
RBAC’s subject outnumbers other access control model subject in Ease of Learning. This could be because 
the audience had a general idea about RBAC even before this survey session, which affected the survey 
scale gradually. But on the other case if we try to know the least ranking model from the above 
representation, RAdAC’s subject ranks low in four categories (Ease of Learning, Ease of Remembering, 
Subjective Satisfaction, Understandability). The reason could be because of risk and operational need 
factors. ABAC’s subject stays in the average scale in four categories (Ease of Learning, Ease of 
Remembering, Subjective Satisfaction, Understandability). This is possible be ABAC takes the Role from 
RABC and considers it as a subject attribute.  
 
Figure 16: Survey outcome for Policy  
Here the survey response of policy from three different access control models (RBAC [24], ABAC [16] & 
RAdAC [4]) is represented in the above analysis. Here we can see that RBAC ranks highest in all the five 
categories of learning. Among the five different categories (Ease of Learning, Task Efficiency, Ease of 
Remembering, Subjective Satisfaction, Understandability). Ease of Learning ranks top from the audience. 
Then if we look closer into it, RBAC’s policy, it outnumbers other access control model policy concepts in 
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Ease of Learning. This could be because the audience had a general idea about RBAC even before this 
survey session, which affected the survey scale gradually. But in the other case, if we try to know the least 
ranking model from the above representation, RAdAC’s policy ranks low in four categories (Ease of 
Learning, Ease of Remembering, Subjective Satisfaction, Understandability). The reason could be because 
of risk and operational need factors. ABAC’s policy stays in the average scale in four categories (Ease of 
Learning, Ease of Remembering, Subjective Satisfaction, Understandability). This is possible because 
ABAC policy only evaluates both subject and object attributes.     
 
    Figure 17: Survey outcome for Object  
From this above derived graphical representation, RBAC has most of the audience response as usual.  
RBAC object ranks first in the section Ease of Learning. Which shows how quickly objects can be learned 
by the various groups of users. Lowest of them all is ranked by RAdAC object. The same RBAC 
that is been in a higher rank in all three-context scored low in Ease of Remembering with total no 
of the response of 24 (among RBAC). Hence the audience couldn’t remember its object compared 
to other four qualities.  
 
    Figure 18: Survey outcome for Model 
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This histogram for model proves again that RBAC is the model that ranked first with the audience 
and majority of the audience considered that RBAC model is been chosen by most of the people 
for subjective satisfaction, that means RBAC model adopts to satisfy user needs quickly than the 
other two models compared. If we take ABAC model and see why can’t it be the best in subjective 
satisfaction, satisfying the user need quickly is not the main purpose? As models like ABAC & 
RAdAC are designed to satisfy administrator needs, it is no wonder that RBAC model has become 
the audience choice.  
4.6 Interpretation of Results 
Results can be interpreted as the below table from the total responses received. By considering the 
above table all grayed out columns are counted to display the minimum points received from the 
audience.  
Table 6.  Concepts to be eliminated 
 RBAC ABAC RAdAC 
Subject 0 1 4 
Policy 0 2 3 
Object 0 1 4 
Model 0 0 5 
Hence from this result based upon the audience response collected it is been evident that RBAC 
model is convenient for the whole group to follow and figure out and it made them feel efficient 
than other access control models.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Upon observation of results processed from the audience response, it can be concluded that 
RAdAC is not convenient for most of the audience though it is claimed to be an advance access 
control method. It is being proved that RBAC is a simple classic of all times based upon the 
audience responses. Apart from this result what matters most was that the audience enjoyed 
learning different access control model with the help of three main building blocks 
4.8 Summary  
In this chapter, we validated our three main building blocks (subject, policy and object) with a 
group of audience. This is to see if the audience can understand the access control model based 
upon the building blocks and the resulted survey shows the level of understanding of this audience 
group is more inclined towards RBAC. Also, the audience group were asked to finish up three 
different task exercises(Appendix) to show their understanding level. In the end, our survey results 
were positive.   
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5 Unified Meta Model 
Objective of this section is the result of finding an answer for the below question   
Q: How the conceptual model is constructed in to a unified model? 
The Unified metamodel is the model built after the comparison of main components of three main 
access control models. All those concepts are discussed above are combined and made in to a 
unified model as follows.  
 
Figure 14: Unified Access Control Model 
Subject: Users can also be subjects, they request for access to perform necessary actions on the 
object. Their characteristics are termed as attributes. Sometimes when granting access it is 
necessary to validate user attributes.  
Subject Attribute: Attributes associated to the subject. It is defined as a characteristic of subject it 
can be a computing device through which a subject is requesting access. Examples where attributes 
of IT component are used in making access control decisions are a user’s access to on-line banking 
account is restricted to a pre-registered mobile device or an organization’s policy allow VPN 
access to employees from a device registered in its domain 
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Role: In organization users are assigned to roles according to their nature of work. One user can 
be assigned multiple roles.  
Policy: Policies are essential plans of action which guide decisions so that we might arrive at 
logical outcomes. They enable administrators to control and evaluate who can access information, 
how long to retain information and how effectively individuals are complying with the policies 
themselves. Policy-based management aims to support dynamic adaptability of behavior by 
changing policy during the process. Place where evaluation of policies are done. Considered 
factors or attributes are evaluated against the predefined rules. For those which are passed will be 
granted access. Predefined rules are the policies defined as certain threshold, which is evaluated 
against the factors to determine if access can be granted.   
RAdAC Decision: Policy decision point is a component of a policy based access control that makes 
to determine the access control requests based upon the available information and security policies  
Object: Object is the resource, which every user wants to access. But only those which passes the 
policy validations can access it. Sometimes even the object attributes plays a vital role in terms of 
determining the access condition. 
Object Attribute: It is defined as a characteristic of the object. Which can be a resource component 
a device, A device here is defined as a computing device through which the access request of the 
subject access the resource. 
Action Type: Action represents how it performs an operation. There are four main actions, which 
are inserted, update, select, delete. If there are any other actions requested, it should fall under in 
any of this main four actions.  
Operation: Operation is some tasks, which represents what it does with the help of actions. Now 
let’s discuss the main functionalities or specific behavior of an access control model over another 
to see how does it suit well while drawing conclusion for a unified model  
Environmental Condition: Environmental condition is the same as factors associated with the 
environment surrounding the transaction. It analyses the increased likelihood of how the 
surrounding environment can be exploited during the transaction. Its purpose is to assess the risk 
category of the transaction with regards to the environment. Factors considered for assessment are 
the current location of the requesting user and the data source [4]. 
Access Authority Interaction: Human intervention is allowed to change access policies and to 
address the operational need for a category of users under certain conditions. Access authority is 
an authoritative external source, which can be an administrator or a supervisor of approving 
authority to override security risk when necessary. Through this RAdAC allows operational need 
to override the measured security risk [6]. 
Situational Factor: In situational factors security risk lies in the surrounding situation when 
information transaction happens. Risk factors to be considered here are specific mission role of the 
user who requests access, time sensitivity of the information, transaction type, auditable or non-
auditable, audience size. Its purpose is to identify the security risk that revolves only around the 
transaction, not the associated data or the user [4] 
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Heuristic: This helps to improve access control policies to grant decisions. Like, various access 
decisions in the past help to improve the decisions.  This is used to find the risk category in the 
transaction based on similar transactions that have occurred before. It helps to fine-tune access 
control policies, improve future access decisions and to predict the future behavior. Risk 
knowledge and trust level are the factors help to assess the risk factor of heuristics [4]. 
5.1 Summary 
This chapter shows the construction of conceptual model to a unified model in the form of meta 
model. Hence from this chapter we can say that the identifying main building block of an access 
control model helps to align the best concepts to form a best suitable unified model.   
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6 Model for Validation  
The goal of this validation chapter is to get an answer to the question:  
Q: How can we verify our constructed unified model?  
First of all, we will start answering with a small introduction about [24]. Which will also include 
a brief reason for why we are considering this model [24] to validate our proposed model. Followed 
by, validation of three main components. In order to validate the unified metamodel completely, 
validation is done by comparing each building blocks of unified model, building blocks are the 
representation of three main components in this paper.   
6.1 Unified Metamodel for Validation 
Model to be validated against the proposed unified model is taken from [24]. This model [24] 
addresses the challenge in the flexibility of making unified conceptual modeling scenarios of 
authorization according to well-known access control models. This study also presents a number 
of existing access control models in terms of conceptual modeling then proposes a unified 
modeling. Mainly it illustrates four different ways of modeling authorization using DAC, BLP and 
Biba, Brewer-Nash (Chinese wall), RBAC, ABAC, RAdAC and TBAC [24].  
We consider this model [24] because it was designed to support enterprise architecture for the 
management of IT. This model also supports the variety of individual models used these days. As 
a unified model, it is capable of expressing its configurations in a flexible manner.  
The first model that takes into consideration is Discretionary Access Control (DAC) in which this 
model is based on the identity of the subject and access rule stating what the subject is allowed to 
do. Its example is a typical windows system [24]. Then the other model of consideration is 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) which is synonymous with the term lattice-based access control 
as its security levels are structured as a lattice. The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model [24] and Biba 
model [24] regulates access to objects like DAC, and security labels denotes security levels for 
classification of objects and clearance of subjects. Both models consider two modes of access 
reading and modification. Biba additionally considers invocation which can consequentially be 
viewed as a modification under the invoked subject's clearance. However, while BLP addresses 
confidentiality, Biba addresses integrity.  
In BLP, reading an object is allowed to a subject if the subject's clearance is equal or higher than 
the object's classification, and writing in an object is allowed if it is equal or lower. In Biba [24], 
reading an object is allowed if the subject's clearance is equal or lower than the object's 
classification, and writing (and invocation) in an object is allowed if it is equal or higher [24]. 
Role-based access control is technically a nondiscretionary model, in which access are granted to 
subjects based on the roles they are assigned for a specific session. Attribute-based access control 
is one of the more recent models, its major advantages over DAC [24], MAC [24], and RBAC 
[24], are far greater expressiveness, richness, greater precision [24]. Risk-adaptive and token-based 
access control have been new in recent times. As it evaluates risk dynamically it is considered to 
be on top of ABAC [24].   
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           Figure 19: Unified model for modeling authorization [24] 
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6.2 Validation of Unified Model 
6.2.1 Subject Validation 
Unified model [24] has more classes for a subject compared to the proposed unified model. Also, 
it has more details than the proposed unified metamodel in this research. There are three main 
classes, Subject attribute, Environmental Attribute and an Object attribute. In which subject 
attribute has been formed as a generalized class for three other classes Clearance, User attribute, 
and Role. Same way Object attribute also formed as a generalized class by introducing two other 
classes Classification and Conflict-of-interest Class as its child class.   within the subject 
boundary subject classes of that unified model are Subject is being generalized into three different 
classes Owner, The World, and Group.  
Whereas while talking about the attribute in the subject boundary, class Attribute Set is to 
represent the set of attributes from ABAC and tokens from TBAC. Each Attribute set comprises 
of its own Attribute, hence it is mentioned as aggregation relationship. Other classes of Attribute 
could have simply modeled as an attribute rather than mentioning implicitly but in order to retain 
the clarity that it is been derived from its actual model instead of representing it commonly as an 
attribute. Every Attribute has its Attribute value set and every Attribute value set has its own 
Attribute value, it is represented in a simple association. But the relation between Attribute value 
and Attribute value set is in composition.  All attributes have certain specifications called 
Attribute Specification, which has a different meaning for every attribute specification.   
When we compare the subject boundary of this model [24] with our proposed unified model, both 
of its differences and similarities can be seen. First of all, lets start to validate with the similarities, 
both model has Subject which is the main component of this boundary. The subject can be also 
called as User. Role and subject attribute are the same in both of its unified models. The 
situational factor can be related to being Environmental attribute, but in order to preserve its 
originality better to keep it separate as a Situational factor. Apart from other existing classes, our 
model has two new classes, Access authority interaction, and Heuristic. Other classes in the 
model are      
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Figure 20: Subject Validation with Korman, M., Langerstorm, R., Ekstedt , M model [24] 
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Figure 21: Subject Validation of proposed metamodel 
6.2.2 Policy Validation 
Policy boundary of the unified model [24] has Access rule as the main class, from which Rule 
specification, Authorization constraint, Access policy and Requirement are originated and 
treated as an entity. These are the classes which support the main entity, Access rule in some 
specific ways. Also, all these classes mentioned here has been supported by few more additional 
classes like Constraints, which is derived from the class Authorization constraint. Also, Business 
object is from access policy.  
45 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Policy Validation with Korman, M., Langerstorm, R., Ekstedt , M model [24] 
Policy validation of constructed  unified model against the published unified model [24] can be 
done by comparing the similarities and dissimilarities of the model  against the proposed model in 
this paper. When we compare the policy boundary of both unified models few things can be noted 
that it has main class Access rule in [24] and Policy in our newly proposed unified model. Other 
classes in these models have not matched one another, though few may have similar functionalities 
like Rule specification, Authorization constraint & Access policy.  
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Figure 23: Policy Validation of proposed metamodel 
 
6.2.3 Object Validation 
Object validation of constructed unified model against the published unified model [24] is done 
by comparing the similarities and dissimilarities of both the models. In the unified model of 
“Modeling Authorization in Enterprise-wide Contexts” [24] main class Object is derived from the 
Core element, hence object is the child class of core element class. Core element class also has an 
aggregation relationship with Object set class, which shows that core element is comprised of the 
object set. Also, the core element class has a child class of Active structure element which has 
an association relationship with Access Rule, the main class of policy boundary. 
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Figure 24: Object Validation with Korman, M., Langerstorm, R., Ekstedt , M model [24] 
If we compare the object contexts of both unified model, it can be easily known that this boundary 
has only a few classes but not similar. Although it does the same job in both the unified model. 
But the difference is that in our model there is a special class Operation, which shows the available 
list of operations to access the object. Other than that other classes like Object attribute and object 
are the classes which function same.       
 
Figure 25: Object Validation of proposed metamodel  
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In my model, I took three different models as RBAC is of the standard model and most widely 
used this has been employed extensively from 70's and 80's. Second model ABAC is on the verge 
of large-scale adoption and the third model RAdAC is of more recent and sophisticated risk-
adaptive variants.  From these three models, I came with a simplified unified model based on the 
analysis of underlying principles of three different models. And it addresses the how to find its 
strong and weak factors. As far as RBAC is concerned strong factor is Role and there is no such 
weak factor in RBAC which is clearly exposed from the audience responses. In ABAC the 
strongest factor is its attribute, both subject and object attribute as it tries to include most of all the 
basic components in general even role can be included in the subject attribute but for the purpose 
of different access control model and its main concepts to be seen role has been mentioned 
separately. In RAdAC basically, its risk adaptability feature is considered to be the strongest but 
in terms of audience response, RAdAC is the one who got very low responses for almost every 
factor. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we validated our unified model with [24]. Our validation shows how our unified 
model varies and overcome the limitations of [24]. Here we compared the building blocks of both 
the access control model, can be seen from fig (20 - 25). This comparison helped us to achieve the 
results as we expected.    
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7 Example for Verified Model  
Objective of the section is the result of finding an answer to the below question   
Q: What is the proof that this verified model is consistent and reliable? 
The consistency of our verified model can be proved with the help of an example designed as 
follows 
7.1 Process of Usage 
This section describes the process flow of how this unified model can be used as an example. Here 
we can see the importance of the order in which the process executes. The general overview of 
this process is as follows, the access request is handled by three different models one by one at the 
same time unless it is either granted or denied.  
When the user requests for accessing a resource, based on its role it will look for its permission 
with the help of RBAC [7] model at first. As RBAC’s permission [7] cannot be not formalized 
according to the dynamic aspects certain requests cannot be handled. In that case, the request will 
be sent to next access control model of our unified model for handling.  For this reason, ABAC 
[16] is placed here so that it can handle the requests with environmental conditions like dates or 
values. Here ABAC [16] tries to evaluate subject and object attributes with the help of policy. Up 
to this level, most of the requests will be processed. Permissions and Policies in RBAC [7] & 
ABAC[16] are predefined. Which is not flexible according to the various situational and 
environmental factors. If any of the factors of the subject is not defined, then the access cannot be 
handled in RBAC [7] & ABAC [16]. Hence to overcome this situation we included RAdAC [4] 
model in the third level. When the request triggers RAdAC model, it calculates security risk and 
operational need based on the real-time factors, and it decides whether the access can be granted 
or denied.  
 
Figure 26: Process of usage representation 
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The unified model has been already verified in the above sections. Mix up of three models, first 
RBAC [7], second ABAC [16] and finally RAdAC[4], so the access request first goes through 
RBAC[7] and the assigned job functions will work according to different roles. Three diagrams of 
Access request RBAC[7], ABAC[16] & RAdAC[4]. First, the requests will be going through this 
process so that it will first the process check will happen based on roles, as through this it will be 
easy to handle the access requests. if there is no permission through the pre-assigned permission 
for the particular role for which the request is been given.  
Different access control models combined to form a unified model. Unified model can be 
accomplished in any number of ways. But in order to bring out the best and flexible unified model 
which serves almost every purpose for an enterprise architecture. In order to use this unified model 
efficiently in an enterprise context.    
7.2 Example 
An example of our unified model will be based on the process explained in section 7.1. Our unified 
model provides more flexibility and it overcomes the limitations of traditional and recent access 
control model. 
Q: What are the limitations this unified model overcome?  
This model overcomes the limitation of RBAC, 'role explosion' [30], which can be explained 
through an example of a large enterprise organization: If one employee requires many applications 
or services with two roles, then the number of roles being managed for employees in an 
organization will be many. Also, it is not wise to implement RBAC for all users, as authorizations 
are based on the roles rather than skill sets which define the specialty of an employee. 
Though ABAC [16] helps to overcome the limitations of RBAC [7] with the help of attributes, in 
the other way it introduces a limitation of handling its own attributes and the effort of defining 
policies. Also, ABAC [16] has to manage the full set of access rules, which is not easier than 
defining and managing roles in RBAC [7]. Hence the ultimate solution can only be obtained by 
combining RBAC [7], ABAC [16] & RAdAC [4] to synergize the advantages of each and to 
overcome its disadvantages by one another. 
Considering all these limitations there was always a need for a 'newer' and 'better' access control 
solution. This solution is provided by our unified access control model. To understand the purpose 
of our unified model here is an example with the help of Study Information System [18].  
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Figure 27: Example of unified model 
 
There are three main use cases in this example 
1. Access based on Roles 
2. Access based on Attributes 
3. Access based on Risk & Operational Need     
Access based on Roles:  
This is the first process that takes place whenever the subject is requesting for access. The entities 
listed in Table 7 are the active entities in this process of access based on Roles 
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Table 7: Security Risk Measure Table 
Entities Description of Entity  
User (Subject) Who requests for access 
Role User is assigned to Role & Permissions are granted to user 
through the assigned Role 
Permission  Provides access to its roles to perform some actions in an object 
Object (Resource) A resource in which a subject wants to perform some operation 
Authorisation Constraints Helps to strengthen permission 
Here there are three users Armas, Veiko & Marko with roles Bachelor_Student, Master_Student 
& PhD_Student. Each user has particular permissions to perform an operation on the resource 
So every user has one operation to perform through RBAC, Armas has a permission to perform 
operation, registerBachelorcourse() using the action, registerBachelorthesis : Insert . Veiko has 
a permission to perform operation, registerMastercourse() using the action, registerMasterthesis 
: Insert  and Marko has a permission to perform operation, registerPhDcourse() using the action, 
registerPhDresearch : Insert.  If it doesn’t suit none of the permissions listed then attribute 
avaluation takes place. Which is explained in the following as another process.  
Access based on Attributes  
This is the second process that takes place whenever the access request does not find a suitable 
permission through RBAC [7]. In this process of access based on attributes the entities listed in 
Table 8  are the active entities.  
Table 8: Security Risk Measure Table 
Entities Description of Entity  
User (Subject) Who requests for access & doesn’t have appropriate permission 
through their assigned roles 
Subject Attribute Qualities and characteristics of subject 
Policy Rules that grant/deny access of  an subject towards the object   
Object  A resource in which a subject wants to perform some operation 
Object Attribute Qualities and characteristics of object 
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Environmentcondition An attribute to influence access decisions 
In this process as the user Marko is a teaching assistant for master’s level subject, systems 
modelling he has requested for write and update access to the object file of courseRegister, which 
is inside the object Study Information System [28]. This is represented in the following Figure 28. 
It explains that the subject (user) Marko has subject attributes as Role: PhD Student, Level: PhD, 
Department: SE, Course: Systems Modelling, Status: Active. Object attributes are Course: 
Systems Modelling, Department: SE. Level: Masters, Status: Active. There is this Policy which 
evaluates both subject and object attributes, which says that the subject can access to Write and 
Update if the value of attributes are same in Department & Course for subject and object. If there 
is any other request requested by subjects then it will be handled in the final process based on risks 
and operational need.   
 
Figure 28: ABAC Model process in unified model example 
Access based on Risk & Operational Need 
This is the final process that takes place whenever the access request does not find a suitable policy 
through ABAC [16]. In this process, access will be granted based on risk and operational need. 
The entities listed in Table 9 are the active entities of this process.  
Table 9: Security Risk Measure Table 
Entities Description of Entity  
User (Subject) Who requests for access & doesn’t have appropriate permission 
/ policy through their roles / attributes 
Decision Helps in making decision by quantifying the risks and 
operational need through available attributes in real time  
Environmentcondition Detects how the surrounding environment can be exploited 
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Situationfactor Identifies the security risk lies in the surrounding situation 
Heuristic Helps to grant decision by accessing the past access history 
Authority supervisor of approving authority to override security risk 
Object A resource in which a subject wants to perform some operation 
 For this process let us consider that the user Marko is requesting for write access to enter and 
update the grade sheet of the subject (systems modelling) he is working as a teaching assistant. As 
soon as he requests for access, it comes to the third process (RAdAC [4]) for processing as it 
cannot find any match in permission (RBAC [4]) and policies (ABAC [16]). It undergoes through 
the decision process as it is the first step of this process. Where risks and operational needs are 
calculated based on the metrices. Table 10 helps to quantify the metrices of different factors that 
the subject and object is evolved.   
Table 10: Subject Level Consideration for Security Risk & Operational Need measure 
 In the above Table 10 there are two more subjects mentioned apart from the subjects represented 
in the Figure 27. Though the main subjects are the three users Armas, Veiko and Marko, this two 
users Professor and Department Coordinator has to be mentioned in order to quantify the requested 
subject appropriately.  Decision process of RAdAC[4] is very well explained through the flow 
chart process in Figure 29. Here Marko’s request to grant write and update access to the grade 
sheet of subject, systems modelling is the input access request. When the request is in Determine 
Security Risk Flow Table 11 will be processed. Table 10 helps to understand how different 
factors are quantified for calculating security risk. Table 12 show the quantified measures for 
calculating operational need.  The final result of Marko’s access request can be seen in Figure 30. 
In which it shows that the user Marko is granted access to this access request. Hence this ends up 
the example of our unified model.   
Subject Level of Expertise 
Armas - 
Bachelor Student level of expertise is very low in risk compared to other subjects  
Veiko - 
Master Student level of expertise is Low in risk compared to other subjects 
Marko - 
PhD Student level of expertise is Average in risk compared to other subjects 
Professor 
(Not Mentioned in example 
figure) 
level of expertise is High in risk compared to other subjects 
Department 
Coordinator 
(Not Mentioned in example 
figure) 
level of expertise is Very High in risk compared to other subjects 
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Figure 29: RAdAC functional model in unified model example 
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Table 11: RAdAC security risk measure for unified model example 
Risk Factors Considered Maximum Actual Security 
Measure 
Characteristics of People 
Role 3 2 
Rank 3 2 
Clearance Level 3 2 
Access Level 3 2 
Previous Violations 3 1 
Educational Level 3 1 
Characteristics of IT Components 
Machine Type 3 1 
Application 3 1 
Connection Type 3 1 
Authentication Type 3 1 
Network 3 1 
Encryption Level 3 1 
Distance from requestor to Source 3 
1 
Heuristics 
Risk Knowledge 3 1 
Trust Level 3 1 
Situational Factors 
Specific mission role 3 1 
Time Sensitivity 3 1 
Transaction type 3 2 
Auditable or Non-Auditable 3 1 
Audience Size 3 1 
Environmental factors 
Current Location 3 1 
Operational environment threat level 3 1 
Characteristics of Information Requested 
Classification Level 3 3 
Encryption Level 3 3 
Network classification level 3 2 
Permission Level 3 2 
Perishable or Non-Perishable 3 1 
Sum Total 81 38 (46.91 % of 
81) 
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Table 12: RAdAC operational need measure for unified model example 
Factors Considered for 
Operational Need Measure 
Maximum Actual Security 
Measure 
Characteristics of People 
Role 3 3 
Rank 3 3 
Clearance Level 3 2 
Heuristics 
Risk Knowledge 3 2 
Trust Level 3 3 
Situational Factors 
Specific mission role 3 2 
Time Sensitivity 3 2 
Transaction type 3 2 
Audience Size 3 3 
Characteristics of Information Requested 
Classification Level 3 2 
   
Sum Total 30 24 (80% of 30) 
Table 13: Security Risk Measure Table 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Operational Need Measure Table 
 
 
 
Numerical Measure Security Risk 
0% – 29.99% Very Low 
30% – 49.99% Low 
50% – 69.99% High 
70% – 100% Very High 
Numerical Measure Operational Need 
0% – 49.99% Low 
50% – 69.99% High 
70% – 100% Very High 
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 Figure 30: Decision upon MARKO’s access request 
7.3 Summary 
This chapter acts as a proof of the unified model created in the previous chapter. It shows how our 
unified model concepts can be applied in real time how it overcomes the limitation of other access 
control models created so far. This chapter starts with the process of usage to show how unified 
model concepts are applied to create an example.  
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Limitations 
Though various studies are being done in this thesis, proposed unified model is a basic architecture 
in which enhancement can be done to improve according to the various enterprise structure and 
needs. Factors of RAdAC [4] model can be included more for security needs, this is lacking in this 
research. To comprehend the advancement of science and technology users with both good and 
bad motive are on rise. So, the system should be capable of identifying right users anytime.  Which 
it does of course but for the enterprise context it has to be the best that is good. It all starts with the 
best understanding of subject environment and policies which allow it 
Finally, there are not so many unified model concepts are available as literature. So, the validation 
was done with the help of so only one validation was done. Security threats in case of 
misconfiguration are not discussed. Maintenance of unified models like cost and all is not 
discussed. Application of this metamodel over time is possible if the factors are well defined and 
cover a range of elements used to authenticate and verify.  
8.2 Answer to Research Questions 
Here we will briefly discuss the research questions  
Q1. What are the most important access control models? 
We have defined some important access control models and from those we took only three access 
control models, RBAC, ABAC and RAdAC. Section 2 is the literature review of these models. 
These three are the most important access control models because each model has its own key 
concepts which make those as a standalone model and lot of other models were also derived from 
these models which made them as super models. Based on that these three are called as the most 
important access control models.  
Q2. How do we define comparison criteria for an access control model? 
We have defined three main components (Subject, Policy & Object) of an access control model 
in Section 3. Based on that different access control models are compared with the behavior and its 
interaction with one another. Three key elements are for an access control are Subject, Policy & 
Object.  As these three elements define the nature of an access control model these are the key 
elements 
Q3. How can anyone understand an access control model with the help of three building blocks?  
Section 4 clearly answers this question through survey analysis. This survey is conducted by a 
group of audience and they understood all the three access control model concepts (RBAC, ABAC 
& RAdAC) clearly. This was observed through the given exercises.   
Q4. How is the conceptual model constructed into a unified model? 
Based upon the key elements defined in Section 3 suitable needs are grouped and matched with 
the respective components of our unified model from Section 4. As it is designed to suit most of 
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the needs it will make the best fit, it is also designed in the way to be flexible so that new concepts 
can be added to this model as well. So, we present our unified model to be your suitable access 
control model. Key concepts are figured out separately as a module with the help of its three main 
building blocks (Subject, Policy & Object). By aligning all the key concept modules, a unified 
model is constructed. Same is been discussed in Section 5 of how to make a unified model through 
alignment. 
Q5. How can we verify our constructed unified model? 
Our unified model can be verified with the help of validating it against a similar research model. 
This is clearly explained in Section 6 We know that not all the access control models are flexible. 
Making an access control model flexible 
Q6. What is the proof that this verified model is consistent and reliable? 
We know that not all the access control models are flexible. Making an access control model 
flexible will be the challenge. But it is possible with the guidance of Section 6 & 7. Section 6 
conveys what all the limitations it overcomes and its consistency against other models. Section 7 
shows the practical way through an example that how this unified model is consistent and reliable. 
Also, to add up unified model constructed in this thesis can be modified or changed based upon 
anyone’s need. 
8.3 Summary 
This metamodel provides an approach to simplify the specification and implementation of different 
concepts of subject, policy, and object in an access control model. It enables the model 
administrators to concentrate on the model they wanted rather than compromising their 
organizational set up according to some specific access control model or implementing a model 
that cannot be utilized completely to its vast extent. That’s because of the distinct concepts in 
access control model implemented and the set up on the organization that implemented this model.  
With this currently proposed, model administrator don’t have to worry about distinct concepts like 
RBAC, ABAC, RAdAC, it surpasses each model mentioned here by implementing all of its 
features as a Unified Model  
8.4 Future Work 
As access control model deals with the security feature of an enterprise set up there will be always 
a place to improve or enrich according to the complexity of an enterprise. This unified metamodel 
provides a basic through this research set up but hasn't implemented in development. Hence it can 
be extended for development in order to build a basic implementation set up. This should give way 
for further research enriching the concepts of a unified metamodel with further research. Also, this 
unified meta-model helps in such a way that the person who is going to implement such set up can 
extend with this as a foundation also it depends upon the goals of such people.  
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Appendix 
I RBAC Task 
RBAC Model in SecureUML Representation 
 
1.1 Choose the subject(s) of RBAC from above representation: 
a.  ApplicationDevelopement     f.  SalesSpecialistPermission 
b.  Steve - Manager         g.  DeveloperPermission 
c.  QASpecialistPermission     h.  Rene - SalesSpecialist   
d.  David - Developer        i.  ManagerPermission  
e.  Sandy - Developer           j.  Arne - QA Specialist 
 
1.2 Choose the permission(s) / policies of RBAC from above representation: 
a.  ApplicationDevelopement     f.  SalesSpecialistPermission 
b.  Steve - Manager         g.  DeveloperPermission 
c.  QASpecialistPermission     h.  Rene - SalesSpecialist   
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d.  David - Developer        i.  ManagerPermission  
e.  Sandy - Developer           j.  Arne - QA Specialist 
 
1.3 Choose the Object(s) of RBAC from above representation: 
a.  ApplicationDevelopement     f.  SalesSpecialistPermission 
b.  Steve - Manager         g.  DeveloperPermission 
c.  QASpecialistPermission     h.  Rene - SalesSpecialist   
d.  David - Developer        i.  ManagerPermission  
e.  Sandy - Developer           j.  Arne - QA Specialist 
 
1.4 By considering the above RBAC model determine which user will able to run which operations 
to access the resource(s)?  
a.  Arne - QASpecialist - createIssue() - enterBugDetails : Insert 
b.  Sandy - Developer - prioritizeTask() - analyseTask : Select 
c.  Steve - Manager - prioritizeTask() - analyseTask : Select 
d.  Rene - SalesSpecialist - calculateRevenue() - checkRevenueDetails : Select 
e.  Rene - SalesSpecialist - reviewMarketingPlan() - changeMarketingplan : Update 
f.  Sandy - Developer - developTask() - writeCode : Insert 
g.  Sandy - Developer - updateTask()  - UpdateCode : Update 
h.  Steve - Manager - approveTask() - StartDeployment : Update 
i.  David - Developer - developTask() - writeCode : Insert 
j.  David - Developer - updateTask()  - UpdateCode : Update 
k.  David - Developer - prioritizeTask() - analyseTask : Select 
l.  Arne - QASpecialist - verifyIssue() - confirmBugDetails : Update 
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II ABAC Task 
ABAC Model Representation 
 
2.1 Choose the subject(s) of ABAC from above representation: 
a.  Bug Access   e.  Raigo   i.  Revenue Report 
b.  Billing Access  f.  Progress Access j.  Sandy 
c.  Revenue Access  g.  Billing Report k.  Progress Report 
d.  Arne    h.  Rene   l.   Bug Report 
 
2.2 Choose the permission(s) / policies of ABAC from above representation: 
a.  Bug Access   e.  Raigo   i.  Revenue Report 
b.  Billing Access  f.  Progress Access j.  Sandy 
c.  Revenue Access  g.  Billing Report k.  Progress Report 
d.  Arne    h.  Rene   l.   Bug Report 
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2.3 Choose the Object(s) of ABAC from above representation: 
a.  Bug Access   e.  Raigo   i.  Revenue Report 
b.  Billing Access  f.  Progress Access j.  Sandy 
c.  Revenue Access  g.  Billing Report k.  Progress Report 
d.  Arne    h.  Rene   l.   Bug Report 
 
2.4 By considering the above ABAC model determine which user(s) will able to access which 
resource(s) ?  
a.  Rene - can access – Revenue Report 
b.  Raigo – can access – Billing Report  
c.  Sandy - can access – Bug Report 
d.  Arne - can access – Progress Report 
e.  Rene & Arne - can access - Bug Report 
f.  Raigo & Sandy - can access – Progress Report 
g.  Arne - can access - Bug Report 
h.  Raigo, Sandy & Arne - can access – Billing Report 
i.  Arne, Raigo & Rene - can access – Billing Report 
j.  Sandy & Arne - can access – Bug Report 
k.  No One - can access – Bug Report 
l.  Raigo & Rene - can access – Revenue Report 
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III  RAdAC Task  
RAdAC Process Representation                
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Different Types of user with their quality measure 
 
3.1 Choose the subject(s) of RAdAC from its process representation: 
a.  Check: If Security Risk is < 30%          i.  David  
b.  Deny Access                                          j.  Sandy 
c.  Check: If Operational Need is > 70%    k.  Check: If Security Risk is < 50% 
d.  Determine Security Risk                        l.  Application Development  
e.  Rene                                                       m.  Check: If Security Risk is < 70%  
f.  Post Decision Processing                 n.  Access Request 
g.  Grant Access                              o.  Determine Operational Need  
h.  Arne       p.  Permit Access 
 
3.2 Choose the permission(s) / policies of RAdAC from its process representation: 
a.  Check: If Security Risk is < 30%          i.  David  
b.  Deny Access                                          j.  Sandy 
c.  Check: If Operational Need is > 70%    k.  Check: If Security Risk is < 50% 
d.  Determine Security Risk                        l.  Application Development  
e.  Rene                                                       m.  Check: If Security Risk is < 70%  
f.  Post Decision Processing                 n.  Access Request 
g.  Grant Access                              o.  Determine Operational Need  
h.  Arne       p.  Permit Access     
70 
 
3.3 Choose the Object(s) of RAdAC from its process representation: 
a.  Check: If Security Risk is < 30%          i.  David  
b.  Deny Access                                          j.  Sandy 
c.  Check: If Operational Need is > 70%    k.  Check: If Security Risk is < 50% 
d.  Determine Security Risk                        l.  Application Development  
e.  Rene                                                       m.  Check: If Security Risk is < 70%  
f.  Post Decision Processing                 n.  Access Request 
g.  Grant Access                              o.  Determine Operational Need  
h.  Arne       p.  Permit Access 
 
3.4 By considering the above ABAC model determine which user(s) will able to access which 
resource(s) ?  
a.  Rene - can access – Application Development 
b.  David - can access – Application Development 
c.  Sandy - can access – Application Development 
d.  Arne - can access – Application Development 
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Questionnaire on basis of three access control model task, Select how strongly 
you feel the following:    
 
 Access Control Model 
 RBAC ABAC RAdAC 
Ease of Learning: 
How quickly the system can be learned by the various groups of users? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to learn?    
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to learn?    
Which model Object is easy to learn?    
Which model is easy to learn?    
 
Task efficiency:  
How quickly the system can do a task efficiently? 
 
Which model Subject is efficient for frequent use?    
Which model Policy/Permission is efficient for frequent use?    
Which model Object is efficient for frequent use?    
Which model is efficient for frequent use?    
Ease of remembering: 
How quickly the system can be remembered for occasional user? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to remember for occasional use?    
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to remember for 
occasional use? 
   
Which model Object is easy to remember for occasional use?    
Which model is easy to remember for occasional use?    
Subjective satisfaction: 
How quickly the system adopts to satisfy user needs?  
 
Which model Subject is satisfied with most of all occasions?    
Which model Policy/Permission is satisfied with the system?    
Which model Object is satisfied with the system?    
Which model is satisfied with the system?    
Understandability: 
How easy is to understand the system functionality? 
 
Which model Subject is easy to understand?    
Which model Policy/Permission is easy to understand?    
Which model Object is easy to understand?    
Which model is easy to understand?    
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